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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet' has revolutionized the exchange of information by
providing our society with a "new marketplace of ideas."2 As history has
revealed, new methods of communication lead to differences in
opinion. Consequently, differences in opinion lead to government
regulation, which then lead to litigation.3 The development of the Internet
1. In Reno v. ACLU, the United States Supreme Court defined the Internet as "an
international network of interconnected computers." Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334
(1997) [hereinafter Reno Ill. Although it is difficult to estimate because of its rapid
expansion, the Internet connects approximately 9.4 million computers worldwide and is
believed to transmit the speech of 40 million people. Brief for Appellees at *9, Reno II (No.
96-511), 1997 WL 74378. For extensive facts on the Internet, its history, and how it works
see Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2334-36.
2. Id. at 2351. For the origin of this marketplace concept, see Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2381
(1996) (upholding a provision that allowed cable operators to ban indecent programming on
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created relatively effortless access to adult-oriented materials for both
children and adults. This fact influenced the government to enact a
regulation to protect minors.4 This regulation spurred litigation which has
made its way through the legal system, all the way to the United States
Supreme Court .
On June 26, 1997, in Reno v. ACLU ("Reno 1/')6 the first United States
Supreme Court case involving the Internet, the Court handed down a
landmark decision.7 Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 ("CDA"), 8 were declared unconstitutional in a 7-2 opinion authored by
Justice Stevens.9 The CDA prohibited the transmission of "indecent"' 0 and
"patently offensive"" communications to minors via the Internet. Moreover,
the Court held that indecent speech on the Internet is protected by the First
leased channels); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (upholding a
statute making it a crime to make an indecent interstate telephone call); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (upholding a FCC order on a radio broadcast); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding a Detroit ordinance on adult
films); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding restrictions on the use of sound
trucks); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (striking down an ordinance banning
the use of amplification devices without the police chief's permission).
4. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp. 1997).
5. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2351.
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1997)) [hereinafter "CDA"].
9. Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
10. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (providing for criminal prosecution
of anyone in interstate or foreign communications who "by means of a telecommunications
device knowingly... (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or
indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age").
11. Id. § 223(d)(1). Section 223(d)(1) prohibits:
Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.., shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
[Vol. 22:763
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Amendment. 2 This comment analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the
Court's rationale in Reno II, examines the implications of this decision, and
explores its ramifications on future Internet legislation. Specifically, this
author applauds the reasoning applied by the majority and questions the
logic of Justice O'Connor's opinion, in which she concurred in part and
dissented in part.
13
The foundation of the Court's analysis in Reno II was its declaration
that the Internet is a distinct medium of communication which can be
distinguished from broadcast media.14 This distinction provided the Court
with the framework for an analysis of the issue presented. The main issue
was whether the Court should uphold "the constitutionality of two statutory
provisions enacted to protect minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive'
communications on the Internet." 5
The decision in Reno II is extremely important for several
reasons. First, the Court has provided the Internet with the broadest possible
First Amendment protection.' 6  This opinion sends a message to the
legislature that broad, content-based regulations on the Internet will be
struck down.'7 Second, the Court was presented with the opportunity to
establish First Amendment guidelines with respect to the Internet.18 These
guidelines create a new application of the traditional legal standards of the
First Amendment. Finally, this case is significant because the Internet is
creating a new jurisprudence.
In examining the Court's decision, Part II of this case comment reviews
the factual and procedural history of the case. Although the facts of this case
are brief, the procedural history plays a crucial role in the majority opinion
because the Court utilizes many of the factual findings and legal arguments
found in the United States district court's decision.' Part III explains the
arguments of each side and the rationale employed by both the majority
opinion and the dissent. Part IV of the comment analyzes the Court's logic
by focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of both the majority and the
dissenting opinions. In conclusion, Part V explores the implications of the
12. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
13. Id. at 2351.
14. Id. at 2343.
15. Id. at 2334.
16. Id.
17. Content based regulations "restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
(citations omitted).
18. Reno 11, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
19. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
[hereinafter Reno 1].
Cox
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Court's reasoning and the ramifications of the decision on future Internet
legislation.
HI. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Origin of the Lawsuit
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed into law, as Title V of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996,20 the CDA.2 1 Almost as soon as the
President's pen left the paper, twenty plaintiffs2 2 brought suit against the
Attorney General of the United States, Ms. Janet Reno, and the Justice
Department2 3 challenging the constitutionality of two provisions24 of the
CDA72 As a result, United States District Judge, Judge Buckwalter, entered
a temporary restraining order against section 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) as it related to
indecent communications.
26
Accordingly, a second group of twenty-seven plaintiffs27 filed suit
against the appellants also challenging the constitutionality of the statute on
20. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1997).
21. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
22. The plaintiffs in the initial suit included the following: American Civil Liberties
Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy Information Center; Electronic Frontier
Foundation; Journalism Education Association; Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility; National Writers Union; Clarinet Communications Corp.; Institute for Global
Communications; Stop Prisoner Rape; AIDS Education Global Information System;
Bibilbytes; Queer Resources Directory; Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.;
Declan McCullagh dba Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks dba Cyberwire Dispatch; John Tyler
dba The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan Wallace dba The Ethical Spectacle; and Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. Id. at 2339 n.27.
23. Hereinafter, Ms. Reno and the Justice Department will be referred to as the
"appellants."
24. These challenged provisions are 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997) and
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
25. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2339.
26. Id. Section 223(a)(1)(B) is the "indecency provision."
27. The plaintiffs in the subsequent suit included the following: American Library
Association; America Online, Inc.; American Booksellers Association, Inc.; American Society
of Newspaper Editors; Apple Computer, Inc.; Association of American Publishers, Inc.;
Association of Publishers, Editors and Writers; Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition;
Commercial Internet Exchange Association; Compuserve Inc.; Families Against Internet
Censorship; Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc.; Health Sciences Libraries Consortium;
Hotwired Ventures, LLC; Interactive Digital Software Association; Magazine Publishers of
America; Microsoft Corp.; The Microsoft Network, LLC; National Press Photographers
Association; Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.; Newspaper Association of
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its face.2 Both cases were consolidated into a single suit and were brought
before a three-judge district court pursuant to the CDA.29 The district court
granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the challenged
provisions.30
B. The United States District Court Opinions
The United States district court judges unanimously held the CDA to be
unconstitutional.31  However, each of the three judges wrote a separate
opinion, each using a slightly different rationale to reach their
decision.32 These opinions are important because the reasoning applied in
each one was influential in the Supreme Court's decision.
Consequently, Chief Judge Sloviter recognized that "there is certainly a
compelling government interest to shield a substantial number of minors
from some of the online material that motivated Congress to enact the
CDA. 33 However, she questioned the strength of the appellant's interest in
this case.34 Chief Judge Sloviter held that the CDA abridges the First
Amendment because it regulates more than is necessary; thus, it "chills the
expression of adults. 35  In addition, she was not convinced by the
appellant's contention that the application of the CDA could be narrowly
tailored only to commercial pornographers. 36 Lastly, Chief Judge Sloviter
rejected the affirmative defenses37 encompassed by the CDA because she felt
America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services Company; Society of Professional Journalists; and
Wired Ventures, Ltd. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2339 n.28.
28. Id. at 2339.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
32. Id. at 824. The following judges each wrote a separate opinion creating the majority
opinion: Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter, and Judge Stewart
Dalzell. Id.
33. Id. at 853. The Court in Reno 11 found the same compelling governmental interest as
Chief Judge Sloviter. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
34. Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
35. Id. at 854 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131
(1989)).
36. Id. at 855. Chief Judge Sloviter's point is reflected in the majority opinion. Reno II,
117 S. Ct. at 2341.
37. The affirmative defenses include: the "verified credit card" defense, which states
that a speaker has a defense from criminal liability if he/she restricts access to indecent
materials "by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number," and the "good faith" clause, which stated a speaker must
Cox
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the defenses were neither technologically feasible nor effectively protective
"from the unconstitutional reach of the statute."
38
Aside from Chief Judge Sloviter's opinion, Judge Buckwalter
concluded, according to Sable Communication of California, Inc. v. FCC,39
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and failed the strict scrutiny
standard.4° Judge Buckwalter reached this conclusion by asserting that the
CDA lacked "simple fairness" because the words "indecent" and "patently
offensive" were not defined within the statute.a Judge Buckwalter agreed
with Chief Judge Sloviter that these provisions had a chilling effect on
speech on the Internet because users would not know whether they were
protected from criminal liability.42 He felt that the "unique characteristics"
of the Internet required cautiously drafted legislation.43
Similarly, Judge Dalzell concluded that the CDA was unconstitutional
and that the "special attributes" of the Internet invalidated any content-based
regulation on this medium.44 Moreover, he distinguished the Internet as a
"new medium of mass communication" 45 that required a "medium-specific"
analysis.46 Judge Dalzell rejected the appellants' argument that the CDA
accomplished their interest of protecting minors from pornography because,
according to the factual findings, the majority of adult-oriented material on
the Internet is transmitted from outside the United States.47 He concluded
that the CDA may have shielded children from pornography originating in
New York, but not from Amsterdam; thus, it did not accomplish the
government's interest.
48
employ "in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions.., to restrict or prevent
access by minors" 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5) (A)-(B) (West Supp. 1997).
38. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 856. Chief Judge Sloviter's logic is adopted by the Court in
Reno IL Reno I1, 117 S. Ct. at 2348-49.
39. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
40. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 858.
41. Id. at 861-62 (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1997)). The Court in
Reno II agrees with Judge Buckwalter's holding. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
42. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 865.
43. Id. The majority opinion utilizes Judge Buckwalter's reasoning in Reno II. Reno II,
117 S. Ct. at 2344.
44. Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 867. Judge Dalzell does not define the "special attributes"
he referred to in his logic. Id.
45. Id. at 872.
46. Id. Judge Dalzell's "medium-specific" approach is adopted in part in the majority of
the Court's approach to the issue presented in Reno II. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2340.
47. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 882. Approximately half of the communications that are
transmitted over the Internet originate overseas. Id.
48. Id.
[Vol. 22:763
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I. THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Appellants' Argument
The appellants argued that both of the challenged provisions of the
CDA were constitutional because they advanced the compelling
governmental interest of shielding minors from exposure to adult-oriented
material through narrowly tailored means. 49 Furthermore, the appellants
contended that since adults and children have a First Amendment right to
receive and to gain information via the Internet, parents will be afraid to use
this beneficial resource if children have access to "indecent" and "patently
offensive" materials.5 0 Thus, the appellants stated that the CDA not only
advances their compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful
materials, it also advances their "equally compelling interest in furthering
the First Amendment interest of all Americans to use what has become an
unparalleled educational resource."
51
The appellants addressed the constitutionality of both of the challenged
provisions by relying on precedence involving indecency
restrictions. First, they argued that since minors do not have the ability to
make informed decisions on whether to view sexually explicit material on
the Internet, the holding in Ginsberg v. New York53 should be applied.54 In
order to protect the impressionable well-being of minors, the Court in
Ginsberg upheld an indecency statute prohibiting bookstores and movie
theaters from allowing minors to view indecent movies or materials. 55 The
appellants contended that this principle also applied to the Internet.56
Second, the appellants argued that the holding in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,57 which stated that government may regulate indecent
communications on broadcast media so that children are not exposed to
them, also applies to the Internet.5 8 Third, the appellants asserted that they
have an interest in creating zoning programs to curb the effects of adult-
49. Brief for Appellants at *14, Reno II (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 32931.
50. Id. at *18-19.
51. Id. at *14-15.
52. Id. at *19.
53. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
54. Brief for Appellants at *20, Reno II (No. 96-511).
55. 390 U.S. at 645.
56. Brief for Appellants at *19, Reno II (No. 96-511).
57. 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978). In Pacifica, the Court upheld the FCC's prohibition of
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue broadcast on radio. Id.
58. Brief for Appellants at *20-21, Reno I (No. 96-511).
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oriented material on children.5 9  The appellants argued that zoning
ordinances, like those in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,60 should
also apply to cyberspace.6' Similarly, the government urged that regulating
cyberspace is "a zoning issue. ' 62 Thus, the appellants viewed the CDA as a
time, place, and manner restriction.
63
The appellants also made several alternative arguments. First, they
argued that the "patently offensive" provision is not vague because the same
words are found in the second prong of the Miller v. California64 test for
obscenity. Next, the appellants urged that the challenged provisions are
constitutional because of the knowledge requirement and the statutory
defenses. 66  Additionally, the government contended that no alternatives
existed that were as effective as the CDA in advancing their
interests. 7 Furthermore, they argued that technology exists for "tagging 68
and monitoring indecent and patently offensive materials.69
59. Id. at *21-22.
60. 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986). In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that
prohibited adult movie theaters from being located within 1000 feet of a residential zone. Id.
61. Brief for Appellants at *21-22, Reno II (No. 96-511).
62. Transcript of Oral Argument at *19, Reno II (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 136253 (June
26, 1997). Time, place, and manner restrictions regulate when, where, and how speech is
communicated. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1989) (upholding an ordinance that
prevented anti-abortion activists from picketing the residence of a doctor who performed
abortions).
63. The government contended that the CDA censors places in cyberspace such as mail
exploders, chat rooms, and newsgroups. Brief for Appellants at *37, Reno II (No. 96-511).
64. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Miller, the Court created the Miller test, which provided
the framework to determine obscenity states:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
65. Brief for Appellants at *42, Reno II (No. 96-511).
66. Id at *25-27. The "verified credit card" defense and the "good faith" clause were
applied in the event that prosecution occurred. 47 U.S.C § 223(e)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1997).
67. Brief for Appellants at *38, Reno 11 (No. 96-511).
68. Id. "Tagging" refers to a system in which the speakers would label or "tag" their
speech as "indecent" so that other users would know the type of speech they are encountering.
Id.
69. Id.
[Vol. 22:763
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Lastly, according to the appellants, if the Court were to deem the
provisions unconstitutional, then it should utilize the statutory "severability
clause"70 to eliminate only the unconstitutional terms and not the entire
provision.7 The appellants stated that "[t]he district court threw up its hands
and struck down a statute without... finding that any more narrowly
tailored, constitutionally acceptable solution exists."
7 2
B. The Appellees' Argument
The appellees based their argument on the contention that the CDA, a
content-based regulation, failed strict scrutiny on its face because it was not
narrowly tailored to accomplish a substantial government interest.73  The
appellees offered several alternative arguments to prove this contention.74
First, the appellees argued that the CDA was unconstitutional because it
imposed criminal sanctions on the constitutionally protected speech of
adults.75 The appellees urged that even though the government interest was
to protect children, the CDA abridged the First Amendment by banning the
indecent speech of adults throughout cyberspace.76 Therefore, according to
the appellees, the CDA was too restrictive because it regulated more than
was necessary to achieve the government's interest.7
70. 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (West Supp. 1997). The "severability clause" states: "If any
provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby." Id.
71. Brief for Appellants at *45-47, Reno II (No. 96-511).
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at *31, Reno II (No. 96-511). For extensive
explanations of the government's views see The United States Department of Justice Home
Page (visited July 28, 1997) <http://www.usdoj.gov.>.
73. Brief for Appellees at *20, Reno II (No. 96-511).
74. Id.
75. Id. at "20-21.
76. Transcript of Oral Argument at *59-60, Reno 11 (No. 96-511). The appellees relied
on the First Amendment rule that the government may not "reduce the adult
population ... to ... only what is fit for children." Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2393 (1996) (citations omitted). In Denver, the Court
upheld a statute authorizing cable operators to prohibit indecent speech on television. Id. at
2397-98. In addition, the appellees cited Sable, which held that a complete ban on indecent
dial-a-porn telephone conversations limited adults to what is appropriate for children. Brief
for Appellees at *21, Reno H (No. 96-511) (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989)).
77. Id. at *20.
Cox
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Next, the appellees argued the CDA was both substantially overbroad
and unconstitutionally vague. 78  They asserted that the CDA was
substantially overbroad because it neither defined its language nor its
reach.79  Furthermore, the appellees contended that the "indecent"
provision and the "patently offensive" provision 81 were too vague.82 They
stated that because these words were undefined, the CDA placed "millions
of ordinary citizens... at risk of criminal prosecution merely for
communicating in possibly 'offensive' terms online. 8
Also, the appellees argued that the statutory defenses were ineffective
and not technologically feasible.8 First, they argued that the defenses did
not provide speakers with guidelines on how to avoid criminal
liability. 5 Second, according to the appellees, the defenses were not
available and were also too expensive to the majority of speakers.8 6 Third,
they stated that the technological defenses such as credit card verification,
8 7
"tagging,' 88 and mandatory age verification were meaningless because, at the
time of this case, it was impossible to effectively and economically
determine the age of a speaker online in cyberspace.89 Finally, the appelleesasserted that the Supreme Court should not narrow the CDA by utilizing the
78. Id. at *39.
79. Id. at "41-42.
80. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
81. Id. § 223(d)(1).
82. Brief for Appellees at *42, Reno II (No. 96-511).
83. Id.
84. Id. at *46-47.
85. Id. at *44 n.25.
86. Id. at *20.
87. Credit card verification requires an Internet speaker to provide an on-line service
with a valid credit card before "signing on" to the Internet. Brief for Appellees at *14, Reno I
(No. 96-511). Then, the on-line provider has to verify the credit card with the credit card
company to determine whether or not the speaker is a minor. The appellees argued that this is
an ineffective defense because credit card verification is costly to the Internet providers. In
addition, credit card companies will only verify a card if the request is for a commercial
transaction. The appellees also point out that credit card verification is an entirely unavailable
defense to Internet users who are not charged for access. Id. at *14-15.
88. The appellees, relying on the United States District Court's findings, contended that
"tagging" is also not available because it is technologically impossible, burdensome on
speakers, and does not prohibit minors from being sent "indecent" material. Id. at *16.
89. Transcript of Oral Argument at *27-29, Reno H (No. 96-511). For extensive
explanations on the views and arguments of the appellees, see The ACLU Freedom Network
(last modified July 23, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org.>.
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statutory severability clause. Instead, they urged that the entire CDA should
be struck down if the challenged provisions were found unconstitutional. 9°
C. The Majority Opinion
The cornerstone of Reno II was the majority's determination that the
Internet is a distinct medium of communication which differs from broadcast
media.91 In order to establish this new medium, the majority distinguished
the precedence relied upon by the government.92
Initially, the majority addressed Ginsberg v. New York.93 In Ginsberg,
the majority upheld a New York statute that prohibited the sale of obscene
materials, such as magazines, to minors even if the materials were not
considered obscene to adults.94 The majority distinguished Ginsberg by
contrasting the New York statute and the CDA.95 First, the statute in
Ginsberg did not ban parents from purchasing sexually-explicit materials for
their children; however under the CDA, parents giving consent to their
children to receive "indecent" communication could have been held
criminally liable.96 Second, the New York statute was only applicable to
commercial transactions, while the CDA did not differentiate between the
types of transmissions.97 Third, the majority stated that the statute in
Ginsberg provided a definition of the materials that were considered obscene
for minors whereas the CDA left the terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive" undefined.98
Likewise, the m~ajority also distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
for several reasons. 99 According to the majority, the statutes in Pacifica
targeted specific broadcasts,'tm but the CDA prohibited broad categories of
90. Brief for Appellees at *20, Reno H (No. 96-511).
91. Reno H1, 117 S. Ct. at 2340, 2343. The Court's "medium-specific" analysis is similar
to that applied by Judge Dalzell in Reno L See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 872.
92. Reno 11, 117 S. Ct. at 2341, 2343. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115 (1989); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
93. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
94. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629.
95. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2341-42.
100. In Pacifica, a listener-supported radio station broadcast George Carlin's monologue
"Dirty Words" in the middle of the afternoon when minors were most likely to hear it.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30.
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speech with no limitations. 10 Also, the statutes differed because the FCC
order was not punitive like the CDA.10 2 Moreover, the majority explained
that the radio is a different type of communication medium than the Internet
and has historically been given limited First Amendment protection.10 3
Similarly, the majority distinguished the zoning ordinances in Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc. from the government's attempt to "cyberzone" by
means of the CDA.1°4 The majority found that the zoning ordinances in
Renton only affected the location of adult movie theaters and bookstores,
while the CDA zoned the content in all of cyberspace.'0 5 Since the CDA
regulated "what" was transmitted and not "where" it was transmitted, the
majority disagreed with the government's contention that the CDA is a time,
place, and manner restriction.1°6 Instead, the majority concluded that the
CDA is a content-based regulation. 0 7
By distinguishing these authorities, the majority differentiated the
Internet from other communication mediums.10 8 Initially, the majority
explained that broadcast media has historically been regulated and
supervised by the government because of its "'invasive' nature."' '°  The
majority adopted the district court's finding that Internet communications do
not have the ability to invade a person's computer or home."0 Instead, the
majority determined that the Internet is different from broadcast media
because encountering adult-oriented material on the Internet "'requires a
series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a
dial.'"'11
101. Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2341-42.
102. Id. at 2342. There were two statutes in Pacifica prohibiting the use of indecent
language on radio communications. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739 n.13.
103. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
104. Id. "Cyberzoning" is a zoning ordinance in cyberspace. Id.
105. Id. In addition, the Court also pointed out that the government interest in Renton
was to protect children from the "secondary effects" of adult-oriented materials, but the
government's interest in the CDA was to protect children from the "primary effects of
'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech." Id.
106. Reno 11, 117 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
107. Id. at 2342. For a good example of a case involving a content-based restriction, see
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991) (holding that "[tihe Son of Sam law is such a content-based statute" because "[i]t
singles out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other
income, and it is directed only at works with a specified content").
108. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
109. Id. (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2336 (quoting Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 845).
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By analogy, the majority relied on Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC to prove this point.' 12  The majority viewed searching for
sexually explicit material on the Internet to be the same as the conduct in
Sable of placing a "dial-a-porm" telephone call.'13 Furthermore, the majority
concluded that the Internet and broadcast media differ because most adult-
oriented material on the Internet provides warning screens for minors
whereas radio and television do not have such warning devices.'1
Additionally, the majority ruled that First Amendment scrutiny should
be applied to issues regarding freedom of speech on the Internet.' 15 First, the
majority agreed with the lower court that the "indecent" provision and the
"patently offensive" provision were too vague because they lacked
definitions.116 Next, the majority established its concerns that because the
CDA is an undefined, punitive content-based regulation, it would have an
"obvious chilling effect on free speech."'"17
As a result, the majority declared that the CDA was overbroad on its
face because it suppressed constitutionally protected speech between adults
when less restrictive alternatives existed for advancing the government's
interest. 11 The majority recognized that there is a governmental interest in
shielding minors from harmful speech." 9 However, the majority determined
that this interest did not justify molding adult speech into what is appropriate
for children.12'
In addition, the majority rejects the government's argument that the
CDA's scienter requirement and the statutory defenses save it from failing
because of overbreadth. 121 The majority, relying on the lower court's factual
findings, agreed that at the time of the decision, the technology for
112. Id. at 2343.
113. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
114. Id. at 2343.
115. Id. at 2344.
116. Id. at 2344-45.
117. Id. at 2344.
118. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2347. The majority was also concerned about the issue of
applying community standards of the person offended to material on the Internet. The Court
explained that the application of community standards to a transmission sent to the entire
nation will be judged by the community of the offended listener. Id. For good articles on
both sides of this issue see Joanna H. Kim, Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of
Local Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15
LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 415 (1995); and Timothy S. T. Bass, Comment, Obscenity in Cyberspace:
Some Reasons for Retaining the Local Community Standard, 1996 U. CI. LEGAL F. 471
(1996).
119. Reno 1I, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2349.
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monitoring all of cyberspace did not exist and the means that did exist were
too expensive for the non-commercial user.1 22 In addition, the Court refused
to utilize the "severability clause" included in the CDA.123 According to the
opinion, even "textual surgery" could not have saved the CDA.1
24
D. The Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's concurring in part,
dissenting in part opinion in which she declared that she would strike down
the challenged provisions only to the extent that adult speech is
suppressed.' The cornerstone of Justice O'Connor's opinion was her
argument that what the majority called the "patently offensive" prov 1n26
was actually two separate provisions. 27 According to Justice O'Connor,
these were the "'specific person' provision"' 28 and the "'display'
provision. ' 129 Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the
"display provision" was unconstitutional because it was technologically
impossible to zone all of cyberspace, she argued that the other provisions
were constitutional as long as the adult sending the transmission knows that
the recipient of the material is a minor.1
30
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the provisions were
overbroad; however, she argued that the appellees had not proven that they
122. Id. In her concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed
with the majority that in cyberspace "'there is no means of age verification,' cyberspace still
remains largely unzoned-and unzoneable." Id. at 2354 (quoting Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at
846).
123. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2349-50. The Court did not utilize the "severability clause"
for two reasons. First, the Court stated that its jurisdictional review was limited by the CDA,
to only challenges to the statute "on its face." Id. at 2350; 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (West Supp.
1997). The Court explained that severing the CDA would change the litigation into an 'as-
applied' challenge." Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2350. Second, the Court stated that "[t]he open-
ended character of the CDA provides no guidance what ever for limiting its coverage." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
126. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
127. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
128. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997)). Justice O'Connor
stated this provision "makes it a crime to knowingly send a patently offensive message or
image to a specific person under the age of 18." Id.
129. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997)). Justice O'Connor
stated this provision "criminalizes the display of patently offensive messages or images 'in
a[ny] manner available' to minors." Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B) (West Supp.
1997)).
130. Reno H, 117 S. Ct. at 2357.
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were substantially overbroad.131 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor contended
that the CDA could have been applied constitutionally because it
was not substantially overbroad with respect to the rights of
minors. 132 Consequently, Justice O'Connor urged that the "indecency
provision" and the "specific person provision" should be sustained when
communication is between an adult and a minor. 33  Justice O'Connor
concluded that the challenged provisions should only be invalidated to the
extent that the provisions encroached on communication between adults. 3
IV. ANALYSIS OF RENO V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Under the CDA, a mother could be sent to prison for up to two years for
sending an e-mail on birth control to her seventeen-year-old daughter at
college if the community standards would define the message as
"indecent."1 35 Similarly under the CDA, an adult can enter an "adult only"
chat room and suppress the speech of every adult present by simply saying,
"my sixteen-year-old son is sitting here with me."1 36 If hypotheticals like
these exist, it is difficult to find flaws in the majority's decision that the
CDA abridges the First Amendment. The majority opinion is well-reasoned
and logical. By taking a "medium-specific" approach, the Supreme Court
correctly determined that the Internet differs from broadcast media and
deserves unfettered First Amendment protection.1
37
In addition, both the United States district court and the Court
accurately found that there is a compelling governmental interest in
protecting the well-being of minors from harmful materials on the Internet
because minors are extremely impressionable. 138 If the government does not
prohibit minor's access to sexually explicit material on the Internet in some
manner, the mental development of minors could be severely effected.139 In
131. Id. at 2356.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
136. The Court calls this hypothetical situation the "heckler's veto" because any user
could sign on and say that their minor son is present even if that user did not have a son. Id. at
2349.
137. Id. at 2343.
138. Id. at 2341. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (Justice Brennan
agreed that "[t]he well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate").
139. Justice Powell agreed that "children may not be able to protect themselves from
speech which, although shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling
Cox
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addition, the Court's conclusion that the CDA did not advance this interest is
on the mark. The pinnacle of the Court's rationale is the determination that
the CDA was both too vague and overbroad.14° Since the legislative history
of the CDA showed that the definitions of "indecent" and "patently
offensive" were omitted, exactly what do these terms mean?' 4' The Court
has repeatedly held that "'sexual expression which is indecent but not
obscene is protected by the First Amendment. '" 142 Thus, in order not to chill
the speech of society, it is imperative that these terms are adequately defined
in the CDA.
Furthermore, the Court correctly decided that the CDA regulated more
than is necessary to achieve the appellant's compelling interest because it
regulated constitutionally protected speech among adults. 43 If Congress
wants to permissibly prohibit this type of speech, it must show that it is
trying to further a compelling governmental interest.144 Although the interest
asserted by the appellants was compelling, in order to withstand strict
scrutiny, the government needed Eproof that the CDA was narrowly
constructed to advance this interest.' 5 The Court accurately reasoned that
since the CDA infringed upon the constitutionally protected speech of
adults, it was not narrowly-tailored and regulated more than was
necessary.146 Therefore, instead of referring to the CDA as failing strict
scrutiny, the Court logically invalidated the challenged provisions by
utilizing the overbreadth doctrine. 14
7
The Court's ruling that neither the statutory defenses nor the
"severability clause" save the CDA from constitutional muster is also
through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech may have a deeper and more
lasting negative effect on a child .... FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757-58 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring).
140. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-47.
141. Id. at 2347.
142. Id. at 2346 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)).
143. Id. at 2347. The Court stated that the "undefined terms 'indecent' and 'patently
offensive' cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other
value." Id.
144. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating "we have required the State to
show that the 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end"') (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
145. Reno II, 117 S. Ct at 2344.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2347. The Court stated, "the breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly
unprecedented." Id.
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sound. 48 Since the facts show that technology does not exist to monitor the
content of cyberspace, the statutory defenses are based more on what future
technology holds. 49 In addition, the Court correctly points out that in order
for the Court to apply the CDA's "severability clause," the provisions would
have to be "'readily susceptible"' to change. 50 Neither of the challenged
provisions is susceptible to severability because the CDA would still be a
content-based regulation even if the Court was to merely remove the
undefined terms.' The Court has held that most content-based regulations
are analyzed under strict scrutiny.152 After applying strict scrutiny to the
severed CDA, it would still likely be struck down because it does not
advance a compelling interest of the government.
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurring in part,
dissenting in part opinion provokes questions. For example, Justice
O'Connor's contention that "the CDA can be applied constitutionally in
some situations"'53 presents this question: In which situations could the
CDA have been constitutionally applied? Justice O'Connor failed to give
examples. If Justice O'Connor is referring to her argument that the CDA
should be sustained in situations where the CDA restricts the speech of
minors and not that of adults, then this argument presents another
question.154 How are courts going to limit the CDA from restricting only
speech effecting the rights of minors and not the communication between
adults? The only means available would be to utilize the CDA's
"severability clause."155 Incidentally, Justice O'Connor failed to address the
"severability clause."156
148. Id. at 2350-51.
149. Chief Judge Sloviter stated: "I can imagine few arguments less likely to persuade a
court to uphold a criminal statute than one that depends on future technology.... ." Reno I,
929 F. Supp at 857.
150. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2350 (quoting Virginia v. American Bookseller's Ass'n, Inc.,
484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (citations omitted)).
151. The CDA is regulating the content of what minors could access on the Internet;
thus, it is content-based. Brief of the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Various Artists and Art
Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at *16, Reno II (No. 96-511), 1997
WL 76015.
152. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1992); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
153. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
154. Id.
155. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (West Supp. 1997).
156. See Justice O'Connor's concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion in Reno I.
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2351-57.
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Likewise, Justice O'Connor did not address the issue of the CDA's
vagueness, 157 which presents yet another question. If the Court was, as
Justice O'Connor argued, to sustain the "indecency transmission"
provision,158 how are people to know what "indecent" means? The CDA did
not define the word.19 Since the CDA is a criminal statute, people must
know the definition of "indecent." Otherwise, Internet users will not know
whether their communication is legal. This creates a potential violation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 16° The Court
affirmed Shea v. Reno'61 which stated, "[d]ue process requires that a
criminal statute 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly."' 1 62 The Court never reached a due process argument because
it invalidated both of the challenged provisions of the CDA as facially
overbroad.163 If Justice O'Connor's argument prevailed that the "indecency
transmission provision" was not overbroad, a due process challenge would
have rendered this provision unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Implications and Ramifications
Reno H has defined the scope of the Internet under the First
Amendment. This decision implies that speech on this new medium will
receive broad First Amendment protection.' 64 As the Internet continues to
expand rapidly, the 7-2 majority sends a message that content-based
restrictions on the Internet will be struck down for a long time to
come. Justice Stevens concluded the majority opinion in Reno II by
summarizing the Court's approach to content-based freedom of speech:
157. Id.
158. Justice O'Connor's reference to the "indecency transmission" provision is the same
as what the majority opinion calls the "indecency" provision. Id. at 2356.
159. In Reno II, the majority stated "[g]iven the absence of a definition of either
term... provoke[s] uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards relate to each
other and just what they mean." Id. at 2344.
160. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 501 (1997).
162. Id. at 937 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
163. Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
164. Id.
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As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the
content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange
of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom
of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship. 65
Further, by analyzing the Internet as a new specific medium, Reno II
will have long standing ramifications on future Internet challenges and
legislation. Additionally, as technology continues to evolve, there will be
new constitutional concerns in cyberspace. 66 It is impossible to predict how
the Court may resolve future challenges to the Internet under other
amendments; however, for now, we can be sure the our speech is stringently
protected.
B. Future Internet Regulations
It is easy to conclude that the CDA was merely the first piece in a long
line of regulatory Internet legislation. 67 Many commentators have called the
second wave of legislation the "son of CDA" or "CDA ].''l6s As far up as
the White House, the wheels are already in motion for new Internet
restrictions.1 69 In addition, proposals for new legislation are already being
created by many state representatives.170 Regardless of how many pieces of
national legislation are proposed, Reno II helps define how these bills should
be drafted in order to withstand a First Amendment challenge.171 The Court
165. Id. at 2351.
166. See generally Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL
767431, at *10 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (ruling on the development of gambling on the
Internet, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota applied its state laws to
an out of state Internet gambling company).
167. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Politicians v. Technology: Why Congress Loves to Hate
the 'Net, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997, at B9.
168. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, 'Reno v. ACLU' - The First Amendment Meets
the Internet, 218 N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1997, at 3.
169. Id. at 7.
170. As examples, California's Democratic Representative, Zoe Lofgren, has introduced
the "Internet Freedom and Child Protection Act" (H.R. 744), Pennsylvania's Republican
Representative, Joseph M. McDade, has created the "Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of
1997" (H.R. 1180), and Washington's Democratic Senator, Patty Murray, is working on the
"Child Safe Internet Act of 1997." Id.
171. Reno 11, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
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implied that future legislation must be narrowly-tailored. 72 In order to
achieve this goal, the Court suggested alternatives such as tagging, defining
vague terms, "making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational
value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating some
portions of the Internet-such as commercial web sites-differently than
others, such as chat rooms."
' 173
The Internet does need regulation to protect the well-being of
minors. However, there must be a carefully crafted balance between what,
how, and to whom the Internet is censored. Due to the fact that there were
no alternatives, striking down the CDA worked to protect our freedom of
speech.
Jeffrey L. Cox
172. Id.
173. Id.
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